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Discussion After The Speech of Carl Beigie

COMMENT, ProfessorKing: You have given us a very stimulating
talk and, if anything, you have been very thought provoking. I wanted to
throw the session open to questions. Yes, sir, Joel Davidow.
QUESTION, Mr. Davidow: It is helpful to try to focus all of this in
one's mind to tie these sectors to the question of which sectors still have
high tariffs, if one assumes that 70% of all trade is already at either no or
low tariffs. Those sectors that will change are those where the tariff is
high enough that it matters. Can you tie your analysis in to where the
high tariffs currently exist?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: I don't necessarily agree with that. You are
precisely right about the fact that a large percentage of the trade that
actually takes place is without tariffs. That's true, but it strikes me that
many of the industries, particularly from a Canadian perspective, but I
think this is also true in the United States perspective, are affected by
apprehended tariff barriers and nontariff barriers.
In terms of corporate decision-making, there is a fear of the NTB
imposition and that has had a very dramatic effect in recent years on the
behavior of corporate decision-making in Canada. We must also consider the nature of the competitive process that takes place within the
country and between firms who are domiciled in one county and have
subsidiaries in the other country.
QUESTION, Mr. Erdilek: I totally agree with your conclusions
with regard the potential impact of a freer trade agreement on the activities of U.S. subsidiaries in Canada, and on Canadian manufacturing. I
reached those similar conclusions on the basis of looking at the literature
on both sides of the border, and I also talked to about thirty U.S.
multinationals.
I have a question about the exchange rate. What are the pros and
cons of a flexible exchange rate regime as we have it now, versus a fixed
one from the Canadian viewpoint?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: First, at the end of a transition period, I
want a freely fluctuating exchange rate. If you are going to have the
same currency, which is what a fixed exchange rate is going to give you,
then you are not going to have the degree of economic policy independence that I think Canada, as a sovereign nation, should insist on.
I don't like the EMS in Europe. It is too rigid and you throw away
the baby for the bath water. The issue is what do you do in the transition
period? We will take a number, say, ten years. I would say, pick five
years and keep the currency within a certain range. It is now at 76.50,
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[US = CN$] but I still like the idea of 70 to 75 as the band. If actual
value were to go up to 75, Canada would be allowed, as part of the agreement, to lower the interest rate spread between Canadian and U.S. securities, T bills, and bonds. Canada would be allowed during this transition
period, if necessary, to have a negative interest rate spread, regardless of
what was going on in the inflation rate during that transition period.
If it went toward 70, then Canada would have to raise the interest
rate spread to keep it above that. At the end of five years, depending on
where it went within that, I would raise it a penny a year or lower it a
penny a year; between the first year of the agreement and the tenth year
of the agreement, you would have a total possible move from 65 to 80.
It could be anywhere within that range, but it would be bound by a
5% band during the transition, because you need to have, in my judgment, some security to carry out the kinds of things that the Canadian
business community would have to do. After that, let it go. Don't interfere with it after that.
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: In order for Canada to take advantage of
some of the dynamic efficiency gains that you were talking about, you
were saying that Canada had to get in at a much earlier stage in terms of
a product life cycle. That implies that somehow innovativeness and entrepreneurship in Canada are going to be important. My question is,
what is your view on the effect of Canadian foreign investment policy,
and perhaps the level of foreign ownership in Canada, on Canadian entrepreneurship and Canada's innovative ability?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: That's a very difficult question to answer
briefly, as I'm sure you are aware. I have been on record as saying that I
didn't object to the national policy of 1973. I objected to the fact that we
didn't have furor right there at the starting point; because what you do
when you put in an infinite industry argument, and then you let everybody in that wants in, you create an excessive diversification of your production and you do not give advantage to the innovative types.
Instead you are scrambling around trying to figure out how you are
going to engage effectively in nonprice competition with your other competitors who are equally inefficient because they are too small. Now, I
don't make my business friends very happy when I say what I have just
said, but I believe in it.
I think if you are going to put in something like the national policy,
you have to have a complete policy. You can't just throw in tariffs and
say, well, then go do your thing, because there are incentives that are
created by government intervention and the result is that you have another form of intervention. Well, the fact in that one is that we didn't
have a countervailing intervention in the early transition period, so that's
where I think the vast majority of the MRS's (Miniature Replica Subsidiaries) came into play.
I have focused on what I think is dominant. Having said that, there
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are a number of companies where the tradilional MRS systems were not
all that apparent and the companies still did relatively well. For example, in the mining industries, we are really first rate in terms of world
leadership on a number of technological developments, so I don't want to
paint too broad a picture and say everybody is terrible.
In that area of manufacturing where there have been relatively
meaningful economies of scale and specialization, we did not get the correct kind of policies to take advantage of that. I like this product life
cycle notion. We are relatively comfortable at a high income stage in the
life cycle; most countries in similar stages are much poorer than we are
now.
Now, with the resource abundance falling down in terms of its bailout for the Canadian economy, as the Macdonald Commission has
pointed out, I think we have trouble. We have got to find some way to
break into that process.
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: Investment policy; how do you think it
should go now that we are totally eliminating our national policy? It
may have been good in 1973, but what should we do with it now?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: I want to see what the negotiation results
are. The negotiation results will really determine what we can do on
that.
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: You see it as a strategy?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: If the Americans were to say, do whatever
you want, I would be extremely surprised. Behind the scenes there is a
fair amount of discussion on the appropriate approach to investment policy between the two countries, because one of the big payoffs for the
United States is to have a prototype to present to the rest of the world.
QUESTION, Mr. O'Grady: You seem to be saying that in the future it is going to be relatively more important to make the newer products before somebody else makes them. It's not going to be so important
to make the old products as well. You seem to think that would argue in
favor of the Americans staying out of the free trade area, but I couldn't
put that together with the point in the middle of your speech where you
said the free-trade agreements would lead to better and more rational
product specialization. If you got that specialization, why wouldn't you
get the innovation in the Canadian plants and in the products in which
they were specializing?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: I am a little ambiguous in my own head
about what drives the U.S. negotiators on this. I'm not saying it
shouldn't. I'm delighted that they are interested. I'm delighted that the
President of the United States has expressed his interest in negotiating
what I have throughout my career in Canada thought we had to get on
with. It is just one of those things, a block for Canada. We have to get a
modem trade policy.
I ask myself what is really in it for the United States? Maybe they
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are just being nice to us. The point that you raise is an interesting one.
My argument would be, if I were now speaking on behalf of the United
States that we could achieve whatever product specialization we want to
within the United States market. It is big enough. What does one-tenth
of the size mean? If I were advising a head office of a multinational, I
would single out the global tariffs. I would single out exchange rate volatility and what it is doing. Then I would go back and re-evaluate the
original go, no-go decision under which most of these Canadian subsidiaries were formed.
COMMENT, Mr. Beigie: That was a clearly stated phrase. You
had a go decision 50, 100 years ago. That decision with whether to export from the United States or to produce in Canada given the tariffs at
the level they were under the national plan originally, resulted in going
with a subsidiary in Canada, rather than exporting from the United
States.
Today, under the same exact no-go-type of decision, the vast majority would say, if we had to do it over again, we would export. That was
the term. I don't feel in any way that Canada loses by having the dynamic boost to its productivity effort on the product life cycle. I'm just
not sure what the United States gains if that is the principal objective
that we are trying to achieve. I'm not saying stay away from the United
States. I'm not Mel Hurtig.
QUESTION, Mr. Marshall: You identified one of the main challenges to the negotiators as being management of the transition in order
to permit the net losers to make the adjustment. Beyond the exchange
rate scenario that you raised, notwithstanding the current volatility,
would you offer them any other suggestions as to what they might be
doing and how they ought to be approaching that?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: The budget deficit must be lowered. How
does that relate to it? I'm concerned that there is going to be a call for
assistance by government to the transition process. The pure theorists
would say that if the private market is so smart, why doesn't it see what
will happen and, therefore, take the rational expectations-type of approach to things.
The problem is that I think there will be an expectation within the
regions of Canada for some assistance to them as they make the transitional adjustments; and that's going to be one of the issues that has to be
negotiated with the United States. What can the government do in terms
of assistance? The problem is that, as I see the political situation arising
out of the budget deficit of Canada at this time, there's not going to be a
lot of flexibility.
If I told you what I really believed, what I would say is that you are
going to have to say an awful lot. That's one of the most effective forms
of adjustment.
COMMENT, Mr. White: Going back to an earlier comment you

Beigie-DISCUSSION

had made about the presence of the U.S. firms and the go, no-go decision;
once those firms have made the decision to go, which is an historicial
event now, they are captive of their investment. Once the investment is
in place, it achieves a life of its own and you are very reluctant to recede
from that investment. The people associated with that investment have
an ongoing interest. That investment derives its own life and you don't
back away from that investment.
COMMENT, Mr. Beigie: I understand that very much. Having
said that, I think you would agree that there are conditions under which
you have to make a decision.
QUESTION, Mr. White: Where does the next plant go?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: That's right. Economists play at the margin
all of the time; and whether it is come or go, it is all marginal.
QUESTION, Mr. Aretz: There's a lot of talk about the transition
period. What will happen economically during the transition period?
What will happen to the structure of Canadian manufacturing?
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: Take the Autopact. The Autopact was not
a serious problem because it was a closely-knit industry on both sides of
the border. Something that people haven't realized is that it was a very
good growth period and it was forcast to be a good growth period by the
negotiators at the time. Even though there was a very substantial shifting of incremental investment, of trade, of export flows, and all of this,
the disruption of employment on either side of the border was minimized
by the fact that it was a very strong, growing environment.
If you were Mr. Reisman or Mr. Mulroney, having the ink dry on
the signature, you are praying that before it goes into effect the world
economy goes into a very buoyant growth period so you can minimize
those massive disruptions. Unfortunately that's not going to happen.
1988 will be a fairly good year, but there are a lot of reasons to suggest
that things are building to a rather difficult time as we enter the 1990s.
That's going to make the transition kind of harder than what it was during the days of the Autopact.
QUESTION,Mr. Knopf: I don't understand your theory of why the
branch plants here would end up benefiting by specialization agreements,
if all tariff and nontariff barriers were removed.
What is the incentive for specialization agreements in a real freetrade situation, especially if at the same time we move, as you suggest, to
an earlier stage on the product life cycle and presumably in the high-tech
area, which is probably the direction that we ought to be going in-or
that a lot of people want us to go in.
ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: I'm sorry, I want to make sure that I understood the question. Are you essentially saying, what is in it if we stay up
in Canada?
COMMENT, Mr. Knopf: Yes. If you go back to the go, no go decision, if we are talking about electronic products or whatever-
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ANSWER, Mr. Beigie: In Canada, the auto companies are greatly
exceeding the safeguard levels of production under the Autopact. This is
due to the existing wage level, adjusted for the exchange rate. Making
automobiles in Canada is very attractive to these companies.
I see no reason why that is confined to the auto agreement. One of
the problems that people continue to have is failing to understand how
we could be doing well in something that we manufacture. The fact is
that we are efficient. Given equal opportunity our workers are quite
good, and if all industries were like the auto industry, the Canadian dollar would be at or near par.
The key to an economist is having to raise the fuel cost of heating
our plants because it is so cold during the winter. Then you will have an
appropriate exchange rate lowering, or a wage rate lowering, relative to
the superior location, the United States, to handle that problem.
Exchange rate flexibility, or price flexibility, will solve anything if
you give it time. That is why ultimately economics is not the dismal
science. From a micro standpoint, economists are extremely positive if
you have flexible prices. It is when you don't let the price system work
that you get pessimistic.
COMMENT, ProfessorKing: That was just great and we thank you,
Carl.

